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Economic Perspective 2 
INDEPENDENCE: THE OPTION FOR GROWTH - A REVIEW 
by Paul Draper 
Department of Accountancy and Finance 
University of Strathclyde 
Aimed at the Scottish Financial Community 
"Independence: The Option for Growth" by Robin 
Angus* claims to provide both "a discussion of the 
pros and cons of independence" from the 
perspective of an observer working within the 
financial services industry and "a number of 
reforms which an independent Scottish government 
could consider introducing to facilitate growth in 
the financial services industry". Besides noting 
from the 'discussion' of independence the three 
"great" advantages the financial community would 
have in an independent Scotland: the fund of 
goodwill towards Scotland; the eagerness of a 
Scottish government to see the financial services 
industry thrive and expand; and because of its 
importance, a strong voice in shaping government 
policy, "It could ask for and could expect to get 
any tax or other incentives which it might 
reasonably be possible for it to receive"; and 
suggesting that these 'advantages' are merely part 
of a wider set of beliefs and assertions which are 
largely untestable except by independence, we 
concentrate in this Review on his discussion of 
reforms that could facilitate growth. Three areas 
are of particular interest: the opportunities for 
investment trusts, the creation of a national 
investment bank and his suggestions for the 
private savings market. 
There is little doubt that investment trusts have 
been the Cinderella of the financial services 
industry. Hampered by legal restrictions they have 
been unable to compete effectively with unit 
trusts and yet have been deprived, arbitrarily at 
times, from exploiting the advantages of their 
status as companies. The existence of a discount 
has encouraged predators and put at risk the 
continued existence of much of the sector and 
consequently a significant part of the small 
independent fund management industry in Scotland. 
Opinions vary on the appropriate solutions to the 
problem. Angus suggests improvements in the law to 
allow companies to buy in their own shares more 
easily, the suspension of voting rights in a bid 
situation, a greater disclosure of interests in 
the ownership of a company's share capital and to 
give investment trusts the freedom to advertise. A 
number of tax measures are also proposed. 
Whilst disagreeing with his diagnosis of the 
causes of the investment trust industry's 
problems, there is for example no statistical 
evidence to support the belief that institutional 
holdings depress the market price of the trusts, 
he is right to try and promote more discussion of 
the issues many of which are of wider significance 
than merely the investment trust sector. We would 
all like to see bids for a company being "an 
informed and constructive debate about a company's 
future" so that temporary suspension of voting 
rights of shares which changed hands following 
announcement of a bid might be a welcome reform. 
The consequences for the liquidity of the market 
at the time of the sale and for the firms 
shareholders, however, would merit further 
consideration. Fuller disclosure of share stakes 
would also be generally welcome but it is not 
clear that his suggestion that all the costs of a 
bid should be borne by a bidding firm would be 
beneficial. Such a system might well deter 
bidders even though the existing shareholders 
generally benefit from bids. Would a policy of 
this type be genuinely in the interests of the 
shareholders? 
Robin Angus is good with words. He graphically 
paints a picture of investment trusts under attack 
from vicious predators who "care nothing for the 
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good of the Scottish financial community or for 
the interests of the small shareholders" but it is 
not clear that the investment trust managers 
themselves are unduly concerned about either of 
these two goals. Management income and growth are 
of far more concern than the small shareholder. 
Why haven't investment trust's put investment 
management contracts out for tender to the best 
bidder? The reality is that investment trusts are 
captive to management groups and it is the 
management groups that are primarily under threat 
from predators for their trusts. A provision in 
management contracts for periodic review of the 
continued existence of a trust and the free 
movement of investment management contracts would 
almost certainly reduce the discount. It would not 
require legislation and is wholly in the hands of 
the industry. 
His proposals on advertising also merit 
consideration. The existing restrictions stem from 
a desire to prevent companies from promoting their 
own shares. Do we really wish to allow trusts to 
spend investors money on increasing the price of 
their own shares? The problem, of course, is that 
to compete with other investment vehicles, 
particularly unit trusts, investment trusts need 
the ability to advertise but might it not be 
better to place restrictions on unit trusts rather 
than allow investment trusts unlimited freedom? 
A level playing field does not require unfettered 
ability to advertise. Angus is correct in 
identifying a problem but his solutions are from 
the perspective of the investment trust industry 
and not that of its shareholders. 
The suggestion of tax reforms aimed specifically 
at improving the current situation for investment 
trusts is more problematic. Whilst not wishing to 
dispute the validity of the suggestions they 
hardly seem relevant to a document that suggests 
the existence of "a comfortable Budget surplus of 
revenue over expenditure". If this is true 
substantial tax reforms might be expected. 
And yet, this encapsulates a severe problem of the 
paper. The scenario surrounding independence is 
never clearly stated. Other policy documents 
suggest that the Scots pound might be related to 
the ECU but no attempt is made to set out the 
legal and constitutional framework in which the 
financial sector would operate or the consequences 
of differences in exchange rates. It is implicitly 
assumed that everything would remain unchanged 
except where specifically amended by a Scottish 
government, but this is unlikely to be the case. 
Could we realistically assume that the English 
government would sit back and see Scottish 
financial companies being offered significant tax 
and legislative advantages in order to secure a 
large share of the English market? It is 
inevitable that national governments would act to 
protect their own interests so long as they have 
the discretion to do so, and if they don't have 
this discretion because of the EEC for example, 
then there is no attraction in independence. It is 
paradoxical that the paper should wish Scotland to 
remain part of Europe, a Europe that is working 
towards integration, but wish to see a 
disintegration of existing relationships within 
the UK. "As long as Westminster retains control of 
any part of Scotland's affairs, there will 
inevitably be recurring periods of uncertainty, 
confusion and acrimonious debate." For Westminster 
read Brussels? 
The Company of Scotland would fulfil the role of a 
national investment bank but be a listed company, 
financed by private capital and run on commercial 
lines. Its role would be to invest on a commercial 
basis in new businesses in Scotland or to supply 
fresh capital to existing businesses which wanted 
to expand. Capital for the Company would be raised 
by a variety of financial instruments including 
stepped preference shares, ordinary shares and 
warrants and it would have a Board of Directors 
chosen to reflect its status in the community. The 
Company would combine the profit motive and a 
sense of social responsibility and would tap 
private capital at present "on deposit in banks 
and building societies or tied up in National 
Savings, gilt-edged stock or other fixed interest 
securities". 
Why should a national investment bank be 
necessary? Would it take on investment the private 
sector did not want and if it did could it be run 
on commercial lines? The paper is silent on such 
issues. It proposes an innovative financial 
structure but takes for granted the need for such 
a bank, its methods of operation and the 
requirement for it to be run on commercial lines. 
In addition, it implies that there are no costs 
from redistributing funds from National Savings or 
banks to the new investment bank; the government 
presumably never has any funding problems! The 
paper also, perhaps inadvertently, throws light on 
the current role of the Board of Directors of 
investment trusts. There appears to be no need 
for financial or economic competence: position in 
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xne cofrcnumty is ail. w>nTirma"cion OT wnat many 
have suspected? The Company for Scotland may be a 
desirable creation with an important and useful 
role to play. There may be a need for a national 
investment bank. The case remains to be ' made 
however. 
Improvements to the savings market also figure in 
Angus's proposals. A Scottish Financial Services 
Act, "stripped of its inadequacies and clumsiness" 
will bring a cheer from many hearts, although it 
is not clear that consumers would identify the 
same areas for change as the financial services 
industry. "A system of regulation which was at 
once more reassuring to the investor and more user 
friendly for the honest investment practitioner" 
is probably no more achievable than counting the 
number of angels on a pin head and besides what of 
the dishonest investment practitioner - isn't this 
why the elaborate system is necessary? 
Scottish PEP's and savings allowances with 
generous tax are also commended, no mention is 
made of the costs and potential distortions of 
such schemes - implicitly what is good for the 
investment industry must be good for the economy 
and welfare of the people, as are cheaper and 
easier security dealing costs. The reader may be 
surprised tnat a direct government subsidy to 
achieve this objective is not the only possible 
way suggested of achieving this aim. 
Overall, the paper is far from convincing. It is 
well written and passionately argued but the case 
presented is one sided and incomplete. The paper 
does not provide an adequate framework for 
discussion and argument. The proposals for 
investment trusts are worth considering further 
but even here the author is partisan and 
prejudiced. He does not start from a 
consideration of what might be desirable for the 
economy, or for the shareholder, but rather 
assumes that "investment trusts are a good thing" 
and should be further encouraged to grow and pay 
substantial fees to their managers. He may be 
right but please let us have some evidence to 
support the assertions. 
Footnotes 
* "Independence - the option for growth; an 
open letter to the Scottish financial 
community" by Robin Angus, Scottish Centre 
for Economics and Social Research, 27 Hope 
Terrace, Edinburgh, EH9 2AP 
